I am keeping this entry as part of an ongoing record: lived experience, spiritual inquiry, and the patient work of finding language for what moves between the visible and the unseen.

Donald Trump’s Early 2025 Presidency – A Global Analysis

Global Leadership in February–March 2025

Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 as the 47th U.S. President quickly reshaped international dynamics. In his first weeks back, Trump doubled down on his “America First” approach, projecting a leadership style that many abroad viewed as transactional and unpredictable (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). Allies and adversaries alike closely watched Trump’s moves, which ranged from sweeping trade tariffs to high-stakes diplomatic clashes. Globally, there was a mix of anxiety and cautious optimism: traditional U.S. partners mostly reacted with concern at Trump’s confrontational stance, while some other nations saw opportunities in his unconventional style (Confidence in Donald Trump around the world | Pew Research Center) (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR). Overall, the early months of Trump’s second term saw a stark departure from the multilateralism of his predecessor, raising questions about the U.S.’s role as a steady global leader.

Polling in early 2025 reflected these divided perceptions of Trump’s leadership. A Pew Research Center survey (conducted mid-2024) found that across 34 countries, a median of only 28% had confidence in Trump to do the right thing in world affairs, while 69% did not (Confidence in Donald Trump around the world | Pew Research Center). Trust in Trump was abysmally low in key Western allies – for instance, 85% of Germans and 80%+ in France, Sweden and other European countries voiced no confidence (Confidence in Donald Trump around the world | Pew Research Center) (Confidence in Donald Trump around the world | Pew Research Center). In Canada, only about 30% expressed confidence (up from 20% at the end of Trump’s first term) (Confidence in Donald Trump around the world | Pew Research Center). By contrast, some non-Western publics viewed Trump more favorably. In countries like Nigeria, Kenya, Israel, and the Philippines, roughly half or more had confidence in him (Confidence in Donald Trump around the world | Pew Research Center). A January 2025 global poll by the ECFR think-tank even found many people outside Europe were “upbeat” about Trump’s presidency and saw him as a potential peacemaker in conflicts, whereas Europeans were largely “mourning” his re-election (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR) (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR). This divergence underscored a general truth about Trump’s leadership in early 2025: it inspired relief in some quarters and profound unease in others.

Trump’s leadership style remained unmistakably bold and unorthodox. He often bypassed traditional diplomatic niceties in favor of blunt demands and deal-making. For example, within weeks he ordered U.S. withdrawal from global agreements (like the Paris Climate Accord and World Health Organization) and pushed allies to shoulder more burdens, reflecting a go-it-alone ethos (US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Impact and Next Steps | White & Case LLP) (The Consequences of the U.S.’s Withdrawal from the WHO | Johns Hopkins | Bloomberg School of Public Health). Experts noted that Trump’s inner circle cast themselves as political heirs to Ronald Reagan, but in reality their outlook was very different – nationalist, protectionist, and skeptical of alliances rather than Reagan’s optimistic internationalism (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). Veterans of U.S. foreign policy observed that while past presidents from both parties stressed multilateral leadership, Trump prioritized short-term U.S. advantages even at the cost of straining alliances (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). Crucially, decision-making was highly centralized around Trump himself. As one analyst put it, “the most important lesson from 2017-2021: Trump matters more than anybody else. His impulses decide. Always.” (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). This set the tone globally in Feb–Mar 2025: American leadership was more unpredictable than it had been in decades, and world leaders had to adapt quickly to a White House driven by Trump’s instincts and campaign promises.

Canada’s Perspective and Canada–U.S. Relations

(Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports) Trucks traverse the Ambassador Bridge linking Windsor, Canada to Detroit, USA – a critical trade artery carrying about $390 million in goods daily (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports). Trump’s tariff threats in 2025 put such vital cross-border commerce at risk.

Canada faced the new Trump presidency with a mix of alarm and pragmatism. The Canada–U.S. partnership is incredibly deep – Canada sends about 90% of its exports (especially oil and autos) to the U.S. (Canada wants new oil pipelines to avoid Trump tariffs; nobody wants to build them | Reuters) – but Trump’s early actions rattled Canadians. In February 2025, Trump threatened steep tariffs on Canadian exports (including a possible 25% tariff on all goods) unless issues like trade imbalances, border security, and drug trafficking were addressed (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports) (Trump sows confusion on tariffs for Canada and Mexico, floats 25% duty on EU goods | Reuters). These out-of-the-blue demands from Washington caused widespread concern. Canadian officials scrambled to decipher Trump’s intentions after he floated conflicting deadlines for tariffs, at one point saying new duties on Canada would take effect April 2, only to have aides later hint at a possible delay (Trump sows confusion on tariffs for Canada and Mexico, floats 25% duty on EU goods | Reuters) (Trump sows confusion on tariffs for Canada and Mexico, floats 25% duty on EU goods | Reuters). The mere threat of these tariffs sent the Canadian dollar tumbling until clarification was sought (Trump sows confusion on tariffs for Canada and Mexico, floats 25% duty on EU goods | Reuters). Ottawa made it clear it would respond firmly if Trump’s tariffs were imposed, even as it urgently sought to negotiate an exemption (Trump sows confusion on tariffs for Canada and Mexico, floats 25% duty on EU goods | Reuters).

Beyond trade, Trump’s rhetoric struck a nerve in Canada’s national psyche. He even quipped that Canada might “join the U.S. as the 51st state”, a suggestion that many Canadians – proud of their distinct identity – found alarming (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports) (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports). Such comments fueled a strain of anti-American sentiment in Canada, especially in liberal strongholds like Toronto and Montreal (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports). Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government (which was in turmoil, with Trudeau announcing plans to step down amid low popularity (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports)) struggled to respond to Trump’s unpredictable approach. By contrast, Canada’s opposition conservatives signaled a willingness to work with Trump, hoping a more cordial tone might shield Canada from economic harm (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports). Still, key figures across the spectrum agreed Canada had “much to lose by drifting apart” from the U.S. (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports). The economic stakes were enormous: a trade war could batter Canada’s economy at a time of rising debt and slow growth, something Canada could ill afford (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports) (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports). Indeed, analysts warned that with Canadians already facing less spending power and low savings, Ottawa “cannot afford a trade war with the U.S.” (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports).

The silver lining for Canada was that Trump’s priorities also created areas for cooperation. Both countries shared interests in energy and security. For example, Trump’s push to revive the Keystone XL pipeline (which had been canceled by Biden) was welcomed by Canadian oil producers. In late February, Trump announced he wanted Keystone XL built with expedited approvals (Canada wants new oil pipelines to avoid Trump tariffs; nobody wants to build them | Reuters). At the same time, however, he tied the issue to trade pressure – warning that tariffs on U.S. imports of Canadian oil would proceed in March (Canada wants new oil pipelines to avoid Trump tariffs; nobody wants to build them | Reuters). This mixed messaging left Canada in a quandary: even as Alberta’s oil industry rejoiced at Keystone’s revival, officials in Ottawa began exploring new pipelines to export oil overseas and reduce reliance on the unpredictable U.S. market (Canada wants new oil pipelines to avoid Trump tariffs; nobody wants to build them | Reuters) (Canada wants new oil pipelines to avoid Trump tariffs; nobody wants to build them | Reuters). On security, Trump’s demands that Canada boost defense spending dovetailed with ongoing debates in Ottawa about upgrading NORAD and Arctic defenses. Canadian leaders acknowledged that investing more in the military (to reach NATO’s 2% GDP target) could improve relations with Trump and strengthen Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports). By March 2025, as Canada’s Conservative opposition (led by Pierre Poilievre) surged in polls (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports), there was a sense that a political shift up north might lead to smoother dealings with Washington. In sum, Canada’s perspective on Trump in early 2025 was one of wary navigation: pushing back firmly on tariffs and sovereignty issues, while trying to leverage common interests in energy and continental security to keep the vital partnership on track (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports) (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports).

Foreign Policy Moves and Global Consequences

Trump’s foreign policy in Feb–Mar 2025 was assertive and often unilateral, with significant consequences for global geopolitics. He targeted rivals like China with hardline measures, altered the U.S. stance on the Russia–Ukraine war in ways that unnerved Europe, and pressured allies on defense and trade. Below we examine his approach to major powers and conflicts:

Hard Line on China and Global Trade

From day one of his second term, Trump signaled a confrontational stance toward China. Building on the trade war of his first term, he unleashed a flurry of actions in February 2025 aimed at Beijing’s economic reach. On February 13, Trump signed a memorandum launching a “Fair and Reciprocal” tariff plan – effectively ordering his team to impose tariffs on all U.S. trading partners that maintain trade barriers or taxes unfavorable to the U.S. (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). This sweeping plan meant that countries from China to the EU could face new import duties designed to mirror their own tariffs or policies. As an example, the White House pointed to Europe’s 10% tariff on American cars – under Trump’s plan, the U.S. would raise its tariff on European cars from 2.5% to 10% in return (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). The scope was breathtaking: Trump was prepared to target foreign subsidies, VAT taxes, and currency practices with U.S. tariffs, a move trade experts said could spark retaliation worldwide (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). Indeed, officials anticipated that major partners like the EU would “impose countermeasures” on U.S. goods if Trump went ahead (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing).

Trump also took direct aim at China. Citing national security, he signed an order restricting Chinese investment in key U.S. sectors such as technology, infrastructure, agriculture, and energy (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). The memo accused Beijing of using investments to obtain American technology and “leverage” in strategic industries, and it sought to curb not only Chinese inbound investments but also U.S. capital flowing into China’s tech and defense-related firms (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). Additionally, Trump resurrected one of his favorite trade weapons: tariffs. In early February he announced a 25% tariff on all steel and aluminum imports worldwide (reinstating and expanding the steel tariffs from 2018) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). This meant no country would be exempt – even close allies like Canada, Mexico, South Korea and the EU, which had negotiated exemptions or quotas under previous administrations, were now hit with the full tariff (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). The aim, Trump said, was to protect U.S. metal industries from a “global excess capacity crisis” largely blamed on China (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). But the impact was global: countries that export steel to the U.S. via third countries (for example, Chinese steel rerouted through Vietnam or Canada) would all feel the squeeze (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing).

By late February, the U.S.-China economic clash escalated further. Trump threatened an additional 10% tariff on all Chinese goods effective April, doubling down on existing tariffs (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). He justified this by accusing China of failing to stop the export of fentanyl (an opioid) to the U.S., effectively linking a public health crisis to trade punishment (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). Beijing’s response was sharp: the Chinese Foreign Ministry condemned the fentanyl rationale as an “excuse” to “pressure and blackmail China,” and warned that U.S. tariff hikes would be met with Chinese countermeasures (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). Chinese officials also bristled at Trump’s unpredictability. In a Fox News interview, Trump casually mentioned he had spoken with China’s President Xi Jinping (or “his people”) after the inauguration and “loved talking to him” (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing), but Beijing did not confirm any call took place (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). This hinted at Trump’s penchant for personal diplomacy – yet his warm words were undercut by the onslaught of sanctions and tariffs. The net effect was heightened U.S.–China tensions, with analysts warning of economic fallout beyond the two powers. Global markets grew jittery as Trump’s tariffs threatened to disrupt supply chains and raise consumer prices. American businesses reliant on Chinese imports or sales feared being caught in the crossfire (a concern amplified when Trump abruptly halted the “de minimis” duty exemption for low-value imports, causing chaos for e-commerce shipments from China (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing)). In Asia, governments watched warily: many hoped Trump’s hard line might check China’s assertiveness, but there was also concern that a spiraling U.S.-China trade war could drag down regional economies.

Despite the turbulence, Trump’s supporters argued that his tough approach was yielding leverage. They pointed to negotiations (however fitful) with Beijing and claimed China was now on notice that the U.S. would not tolerate unfair trade. By early March, there were hints that backchannel talks were underway to resolve some trade issues, but no breakthroughs yet. In sum, Trump’s foreign policy toward China and trade in early 2025 was confrontational, creating significant global economic uncertainty. It marked a stark contrast to previous administrations’ cautious engagement – whereas Biden and Obama sought calibrated pressure alongside cooperation, Trump showed readiness to “decouple” economically if it meant securing what he saw as America’s short-term interests (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). This strategy pleased U.S. China hawks but raised the specter of a protracted economic Cold War with unpredictable consequences for the world economy.

Russia, Ukraine, and Transatlantic Tensions

If Trump’s China policy was aggressive, his approach to Russia and the war in Ukraine was perhaps the most dramatic – and divisive – shift in U.S. foreign policy during Feb–Mar 2025. Trump had long signaled he wanted to “end the war” in Ukraine and re-evaluate U.S. support for Kyiv (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?) (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). Upon taking office, he moved in that direction with startling speed. He paused U.S. military aid to Ukraine in late February (Trump says Ukraine willing to negotiate, Russia ‘ready for peace’ | Reuters) (Trump says Ukraine willing to negotiate, Russia ‘ready for peace’ | Reuters), and days later hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House for what turned into an explosive confrontation.

(Ukraine’s Zelenskyy thought he’d look like a tough guy. He had another thing coming from Trump and Vance | Fox News) President Trump meets with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy in the Oval Office on Feb. 28, 2025 – a confrontation that highlighted the rift between Trump’s stance and Kyiv’s appeals (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters) (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters).

In an extraordinary Oval Office meeting on Feb. 28, 2025, Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance clashed openly with Zelenskyy in front of reporters (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters). Expecting to shore up U.S. support, Zelenskyy instead found himself scolded for showing “disrespect” and acting “entitled” to American help (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters) (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters). Trump threatened to withdraw U.S. backing unless Zelenskyy was more “appreciative” and willing to negotiate with Russia (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters) (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters). The meeting ended abruptly – Zelenskyy was asked to leave the White House early, and a planned U.S.-Ukraine mineral rights deal (meant to reward Ukraine with investment in exchange for peace concessions) was left unsigned (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters) (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters). This public blow-up shocked diplomats. It was virtually unheard-of for a U.S. president to berate an allied leader fighting a war of survival on such a stage. European allies immediately leapt to Zelenskyy’s defense: Germany’s Friedrich Merz (fresh off an election win as chancellor-in-waiting) warned the U.S. “against turning its back on allies” and said it felt like “five minutes to midnight for Europe” if Washington abandoned Kyiv (Wary of Trump, Germany’s Merz warns it’s ‘five minutes to midnight for Europe’ | Reuters) (Wary of Trump, Germany’s Merz warns it’s ‘five minutes to midnight for Europe’ | Reuters). Merz pointedly reminded everyone “we must never confuse aggressor and victim in this war,” implicitly rebuking Trump’s stance (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters) (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters). French President Emmanuel Macron urgently phoned Zelenskyy to offer support, and NATO’s Secretary General (Mark Rutte) coordinated an emergency consultation with European leaders on how to secure Ukraine if the U.S. pulled away (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters) (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters). The transatlantic alliance was in turmoil, with one European official bluntly labeling Trump’s approach “appeasement” of Putin (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council).

Trump, for his part, made no apologies. He argued that Europe needed to “take the lead” in its own defense (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council). He admired Russia’s Vladimir Putin and believed he could strike a deal to end the war – even if that meant Ukraine ceding territory (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?) (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). Within days of the Oval Office incident, Trump indicated he was ready to broker peace talks. In his March 4 address to Congress, he claimed both Ukraine and Russia were “ready for peace” and that only U.S. meddling had prolonged the conflict (Trump says Ukraine willing to negotiate, Russia ‘ready for peace’ | Reuters) (Trump says Ukraine willing to negotiate, Russia ‘ready for peace’ | Reuters). To push negotiations, Trump froze all U.S. military aid to Ukraine indefinitely (Trump says Ukraine willing to negotiate, Russia ‘ready for peace’ | Reuters). This marked a 180-degree reversal of U.S. policy – the Biden administration had sent tens of billions in arms to help Ukraine resist aggression, but Trump asserted it was time to stop the “blank check.” Under pressure, Zelenskyy publicly struck a conciliatory tone, even tweeting gratitude to Trump and a willingness to “make things right” after the “regrettable” clash (Trump says Ukraine willing to negotiate, Russia ‘ready for peace’ | Reuters) (Trump says Ukraine willing to negotiate, Russia ‘ready for peace’ | Reuters). Behind the scenes, however, Kyiv was deeply alarmed. Ukraine’s government began seeking alternative security guarantees from Europe, and Britain convened talks among European leaders to create a security “backstop” for Ukraine (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters) (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters).

The global consequences of Trump’s tilt toward Russia were significant. Moscow welcomed what it saw as a strategic win – Russian state media gloated that Washington was “finally destroying” the Western order from within, echoing comments by some observers that Trump’s America was undermining the very alliances that check Russia (Trump’s US ‘destroying’ world order already questioned by Russia …). Putin himself, according to European intelligence, felt vindicated in his long war of attrition, believing Western unity was crumbling just as he’d hoped (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). In Europe, Trump’s moves spurred an unprecedented push for self-reliance. Traditionally dovish countries started boosting defense budgets (Germany, under Merz’s urging, vowed to meet spending targets and modernize its forces (Wary of Trump, Germany’s Merz warns it’s ‘five minutes to midnight for Europe’ | Reuters) (Wary of Trump, Germany’s Merz warns it’s ‘five minutes to midnight for Europe’ | Reuters)). The EU’s foreign policy chief (Estonia’s Kaja Kallas) lambasted Washington’s exclusion of Europe from talks and questioned if the U.S. was still a reliable ally (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council) (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council). “Can Washington really mean these things?”, she asked, noting the deep disbelief in Brussels at Trump’s stance (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council). Eastern European states like Poland and the Baltic countries – which rely on U.S. security guarantees – felt especially vulnerable. Polish commentators described it as a “wake-up call” that Europe might be “alone in a Trumpian world” and should prepare to defend Ukraine (and itself) largely without U.S. help (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR) (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR).

NATO as an institution faced a serious stress test. Trump had frequently criticized NATO allies for not spending enough, and in early 2025 he kept up that pressure. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told NATO countries to “boost defense or risk U.S. pullback”, reinforcing Trump’s message (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council). The new dynamic raised doubts about the future of the alliance. In Germany, Merz even questioned whether NATO would “remain in its current form” if the U.S. pivoted away (Likely next German chancellor Merz questions NATO’s future in …). Still, NATO did not collapse – European members rallied together, and even traditionally neutral Sweden and Finland (which had joined NATO in 2024) took on more active roles in planning European-led support for Ukraine. By end of March, a fragile arrangement emerged: the U.S. would pursue a ceasefire deal with Russia, while Europeans would increase military aid to Ukraine to prevent an outright collapse in the meantime. The long-term implications, however, were profound. Many noted that Western unity from 2022–24 had been key in resisting Putin, and now that unity was fractured (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?) (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). If Trump pressured Ukraine to yield territory to Russia (as he hinted he might), it could set a troubling precedent globally – potentially “emboldening Russia to encroach on other neighbors and offering China a template for its own territorial expansionism” (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?).

In summary, Trump’s handling of Russia and the Ukraine war in early 2025 led to a rift with Europe and a sense of global power realignment. Allies in NATO felt compelled to step up militarily and question U.S. commitment, while adversaries like Russia saw a chance to gain ground. It was a dramatic departure from the policies of Obama, Trump’s own first term, and Biden – all of whom, despite differences, had maintained basic support for Europe’s security. Trump’s willingness to deal directly with Putin, even at Ukraine’s expense, left Ukraine’s fate uncertain and marked one of the most significant geopolitical shifts of the period.

Relations with Europe and Other Allies

Trump’s early 2025 foreign policy put significant strain on relations with core U.S. allies in Europe and beyond. Apart from the Ukraine issue, his tone toward the EU and NATO was often adversarial. European leaders, who had grown accustomed to Biden’s collaborative approach, suddenly found Washington more critical and less consultative. For instance, Trump revived threats of tariffs on European exports – most notably a proposed 25% tariff on European cars to force a more “reciprocal” trade balance (Trump sows confusion on tariffs for Canada and Mexico, floats 25% duty on EU goods | Reuters) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). This threat sent a chill through EU capitals, especially Berlin, as Germany’s auto industry is vital to its economy. European Union officials warned they were prepared to retaliate in kind if U.S. auto tariffs went into effect, raising the specter of a transatlantic trade war on top of the geopolitical rifts (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing).

Politically, Europe’s establishment viewed Trump’s return with dismay. A senior EU diplomat privately described the mood as “five minutes to midnight for Europe” – indicating that Trump 2.0 was seen as an emergency for the European project (Wary of Trump, Germany’s Merz warns it’s ‘five minutes to midnight for Europe’ | Reuters) (Wary of Trump, Germany’s Merz warns it’s ‘five minutes to midnight for Europe’ | Reuters). In Germany, the moderate CDU leader Merz (poised to become Chancellor) tried to balance firm warnings to the U.S. with calls for Europe to “build up its own defense” urgently (Wary of Trump, Germany’s Merz warns it’s ‘five minutes to midnight for Europe’ | Reuters) (Wary of Trump, Germany’s Merz warns it’s ‘five minutes to midnight for Europe’ | Reuters). France’s President Macron took a more confrontational tack: media reports say he directly told Trump that any “surrender” in Ukraine would be unacceptable (First Thing: Macron warns Trump against ‘surrender’ in Ukraine). At the same time, European far-right politicians – like Marine Le Pen in France or Viktor Orbán in Hungary – applauded Trump’s stances. They echoed his nationalist talking points, hoping to ride a similar wave in Europe. (Orbán notably said he finally had a friend in the White House again, given Trump’s sympathetic view of Hungary’s illiberal policies.) This split in European politics – mainstream vs. populist – was sharpened by Trump’s presidency, as each side drew lessons from his actions.

Traditional U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific also had to recalibrate. Japan and South Korea, reliant on the U.S. security umbrella, were uneasy that Trump might also demand they pay more for defense or rethink commitments (as he had hinted in the past). Early 2025 didn’t see a crisis in Asia, but there were undercurrents of concern – especially as Trump focused on striking a deal with North Korea again. (He reportedly sent feelers to Pyongyang about another summit, seeking a foreign policy “win.”) Meanwhile, Taiwan worried it could become a bargaining chip in Trump’s negotiations with Beijing. Although Trump took a congratulatory call from Taiwan’s president when first elected in 2016, this time around he largely stayed quiet on Taiwan, apart from grumbling that Taiwan should “pay more” for U.S. support (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?) (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). The absence of a strong U.S. affirmation for Taiwan in these months caused anxiety in Taipei and Tokyo, given China’s increased military drills in the Taiwan Strait.

In the Middle East, Trump’s second-term approach was a continuation of his first: strongly pro-Israel, skeptical of Iran, and aligned with authoritarian Arab leaders. He embraced Israel’s right-wing government; in fact, by March 2025 Trump had invited Prime Minister Netanyahu to Washington, signaling support amid the recent Israel–Hamas conflict ceasefire. He also hinted at reviving the idea of a “deal of the century” for Middle East peace, but experts noted the ground had shifted – Gulf states now demanded more for the Palestinians, and Israel’s government was unreceptive to concessions (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?) (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). On Iran, Trump’s aversion to “endless wars” continued to hold: even though tensions with Iran’s proxy forces remained high (especially in Syria and Iraq), Trump resisted any calls for direct military intervention (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). Instead, he tightened sanctions further in February, hoping economic strangulation would curb Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions. This pleased U.S. partners like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Those countries, for their part, welcomed Trump’s return – Riyadh saw a chance to get a better deal than it had with Biden, possibly even a security pact, and felt emboldened to press its war in Yemen to a conclusion with U.S. moral backing.

One noteworthy development was Trump’s outreach to developing countries often termed the “Global South.” Sensing an opportunity to counter China’s influence, Trump’s administration launched a charm offensive in regions like Latin America and Africa. In March, Vice President Vance toured South America, promoting bilateral trade deals (with a focus on critical minerals and energy) and emphasizing anti-socialist rhetoric. Some observers noted this was partly to shore up support at the UN and challenge China’s Belt and Road investments. Reactions were mixed: Brazil’s government (which had shifted rightward) was receptive, while South Africa’s President publicly criticized Trump’s “great power posturing” and called for non-alignment. Still, polls suggested that in many African and South Asian countries, people believed Trump’s America might pay more attention to them than Biden’s had – the ECFR survey found countries like India, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria largely thought Trump’s presidency would benefit them or at least not harm their interests (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR) (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR). This underscores that Trump’s unilateral style, though abrasive to Western allies, did not alienate all parts of the world. In some cases, it attracted leaders who preferred deals without lectures on democracy and human rights.

In summary, Trump’s foreign policy in early 2025 recalibrated global alliances. Europe felt the strain most, with the post-WWII bond to America fraying as never before (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council). Allied nations in Asia and the Middle East adjusted pragmatically, seeking to stay on Trump’s good side or hedge their bets. And rival powers like Russia and China tested how far they could push the envelope with a U.S. president seemingly less interested in upholding the old liberal international order. The world entered a more multipolar, uncertain phase in which U.S. leadership was less predictable – both willing to confront (as with China) and quick to deal (as with Russia) – leaving other nations to guess which approach Trump might take next.

Economic Implications at Home and Abroad

Trump’s policies in February–March 2025 carried significant economic implications for the United States and the global economy. Domestically, Trump aimed to rekindle the growth formula of his first term: deregulation, tax cuts, and protection for U.S. industries. Internationally, however, his aggressive trade measures and America-first deals created volatility and risked retaliation.

A cornerstone of Trump’s early economic agenda was trade protectionism. By re-imposing and expanding tariffs on a wide array of imports, Trump sought to boost U.S. manufacturing and reduce trade deficits. In practice, these tariffs acted as taxes on imported goods – which American consumers and businesses would partly bear. For example, the 25% universal steel tariff raised input costs for U.S. automakers and construction firms. Industry groups warned this could drive up prices for cars and infrastructure projects, potentially fueling inflation. The administration insisted the tariffs would bring back steel jobs, citing the initial 2018 tariffs’ temporary bump to U.S. steel output (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). But unlike 2018, when many allies were exempted, the 2025 tariffs spared no one, prompting concerns that allies like Canada and the EU might slap their own tariffs on U.S. exports in response (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). Such a cycle could hurt American exporters (farmers, for instance, feared losing markets for soy and pork again as in the 2018 trade war). Indeed, Canada indicated it was “prepared – there will be a firm response” if Trump’s tariffs hit them (Trump sows confusion on tariffs for Canada and Mexico, floats 25% duty on EU goods | Reuters). The mere uncertainty around tariff implementation (with Trump changing deadlines and conditions frequently in February) was enough to make business planners skittish. U.S. stock markets experienced increased volatility: when Trump floated a one-month delay on tariffs for Canada/Mexico, markets briefly rallied, only to dip again when his aides said the original March 4 deadline stood (Trump sows confusion on tariffs for Canada and Mexico, floats 25% duty on EU goods | Reuters).

Another key aspect was energy and infrastructure policy, which intertwined with economics. Trump quickly moved to boost fossil fuel industries – not only by reviving Keystone XL, which promised construction jobs and future oil flows from Canada, but also by green-lighting more drilling on federal lands and offshore. In February he signed executive orders to cut environmental red tape, arguing this would lower energy prices and make the U.S. an “energy superpower.” Oil output did tick up as shale producers gained confidence, and gasoline prices in the U.S. fell modestly from their 2024 highs. However, Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement signaled to clean-energy investors that U.S. climate policy was swinging away from renewables (US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Impact and Next Steps | White & Case LLP) (US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Impact and Next Steps | White & Case LLP). Some domestic cleantech firms worried that could mean less support for electric vehicles and solar, potentially ceding ground to Europe and China in those growing industries. On the positive side for U.S. business, Trump’s regulatory pullback extended to areas like banking and manufacturing – he ordered a review of all major Biden-era regulations, aiming to scrap those deemed “job-killing.” Corporate America generally welcomed the tax and deregulation talk (Trump teased a possible middle-class tax cut and capital gains tax indexation, though no bill had passed by March). This fueled optimism on Wall Street that profits would increase. The Dow Jones index, after an initial dip around the Ukraine policy shock, hit record highs again by late March as investors bet on lower taxes and high infrastructure spending (Trump had also proposed a new infrastructure package focusing on rural broadband and highways).

Internationally, Trump’s economic nationalism had mixed consequences. U.S. trading partners started exploring ways to reduce dependency on American markets. Canada, as noted, began pushing new pipelines to send oil to Asia rather than solely the U.S. (Canada wants new oil pipelines to avoid Trump tariffs; nobody wants to build them | Reuters) (Canada wants new oil pipelines to avoid Trump tariffs; nobody wants to build them | Reuters). The EU accelerated trade talks with other regions (like reviving an EU-Mercosur deal in South America) to hedge against U.S. tariffs. Countries caught in between the U.S.-China confrontation, such as those in Southeast Asia, felt pressure on their export-driven economies. For instance, Vietnam, a major exporter of electronics and textiles to the U.S., feared being hit by Trump’s new “reciprocal” tariffs meant to punish any country with which the U.S. runs a deficit (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). In response, Vietnam and others considered cutting some tariffs on U.S. goods to appease Trump. A scramble to adjust trade policies was underway across capitals – essentially, Trump’s actions forced many nations to revisit their trade alignment, some leaning more toward the EU or China as a counterweight.

The global economic growth outlook in early 2025 became more uncertain. The IMF and World Bank, in their February reports, cautioned that widespread tariff hikes could shave a significant fraction off worldwide GDP growth if they escalated. They also flagged the risk of inflation if supply chains re-shuffled inefficiently. On the other hand, a few countries saw potential gains: Mexico, for example, hoped to attract companies seeking to relocate supply chains out of China (a continuation of the “near-shoring” trend from Trump’s first term). Likewise, some U.S. allies in Asia (like Vietnam or India) thought they might capture Chinese market share in the U.S. if Chinese goods faced extra 10% tariffs. Such shifts, however, would take time and were not guaranteed.

One immediate economic consequence of Trump’s foreign policy was in defense spending. After Trump’s insistence that allies pay more, countries like Germany, the UK, Japan, and Canada all announced plans by March to increase their military budgets ( PM meeting with President Trump: 27 February 2025 – GOV.UK ) ( PM meeting with President Trump: 27 February 2025 – GOV.UK ). This in turn was poised to benefit U.S. defense contractors (a boon to the U.S. economy) if those allies bought American weaponry to modernize. Indeed, shares of major U.S. defense firms climbed in anticipation of new orders from NATO allies scrambling to appease Trump and bolster their forces.

Finally, Trump’s early domestic moves had social and economic ripple effects as well. He directed a clampdown on immigration, which included stricter border enforcement and plans to use the U.S. military to assist in mass deportations of undocumented immigrants (a highly controversial proposal) (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). While this pleased his base and could tighten the labor market, many economists worried it would lead to labor shortages in sectors like agriculture and construction, potentially driving up wages (good for workers) but also prices (feeding inflation). Businesses reliant on immigrant labor lobbied against overly harsh measures. By March, no major new immigration law had passed, but enforcement had visibly tightened at the southern border, and migrant crossings were down, for better or worse.

In summary, the economic implications of Trump’s actions in Feb–Mar 2025 were far-reaching. Domestically, his business-friendly policies and protectionism aimed to boost certain industries but carried the risk of higher consumer prices and international retaliation. Internationally, his tariff regime and deal-making ethos disrupted the status quo, prompting both pushback (allies retaliating or diversifying away from U.S. trade) and accommodation (some countries yielding to U.S. trade demands). The early evidence suggested Trump’s approach injected significant uncertainty into the world economy – with possible upsides for the U.S. in extracted concessions, but also the danger of undermining the very global trading system that underpinned economic growth in previous decades. Economists debated whether the short-term gains for U.S. jobs were worth the long-term costs of a more fragmented global market. The only certainty was that, much like Trump’s political style, his economic policy was disruptive – benefitting some, disadvantaging others, and keeping everyone on edge.

Comparisons with Previous Presidents

Trump’s early 2025 presidency invites many comparisons with past U.S. leaders, highlighting how unusual his actions were in the modern context. Relative to his immediate predecessor, Joe Biden, the contrast was stark: Biden had emphasized restoring alliances, engaging in collective action (on climate, pandemic response, etc.), and steady leadership, whereas Trump unapologetically prioritized unilateral U.S. advantage and was willing to upend alliances to do so. For example, where Biden championed NATO unity against Russian aggression, Trump openly questioned NATO’s value and pressed Ukraine to cut a deal with the invader – a reversal of decades of U.S. policy (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?) (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). European officials said “to say the EU reacted negatively would be an understatement” – the shock was that profound (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council).

Looking further back, comparisons to Ronald Reagan were occasionally drawn by Trump’s advisors, but in reality Trump’s approach diverged significantly. Reagan was known for a sunny optimism, free-trade orientation (he helped usher in the GATT global trading system), and a staunch anti-Soviet stance grounded in alliance-building. Trump, by contrast, espoused a much more pessimistic view of global affairs – one in which he portrayed allies as burdens or cheats, and extolled an almost zero-sum view of trade. A Brookings expert noted: “Reagan was an internationalist and free trader… The Trumpians are protectionists and ethno-nationalists” (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). Indeed, no U.S. president since perhaps the 1920s had embraced protectionism as openly as Trump did in 2025. His across-the-board tariff plan harked back to the era of Smoot-Hawley Tariffs (1930) in its breadth, something recent presidents of both parties had firmly avoided in fear of sparking trade wars.

In terms of diplomatic style, Trump’s handling of the Zelenskyy meeting drew comparisons to confrontations like Nixon’s brusque exchanges with allies. Yet even Nixon, despite his tough talk, worked behind the scenes to strengthen partners (and would never publicly humiliate a leader of a nation under attack). Trump’s Oval Office outburst was truly without modern precedent – such scenes, if they occurred, usually happened behind closed doors. The public nature of that clash was a reminder of Trump’s reality-TV honed instinct to play to audiences and project strength, something few previous presidents did with allied leaders.

On domestic policy, Trump’s push to deregulate and cut taxes aligned with typical Republican agendas (Reagan and George W. Bush also pursued tax cuts). However, Trump differed in his willingness to use the executive pen far more expansively to reverse policies of his predecessor rapidly. For instance, re-exiting the Paris Climate Accord on Day 1 – no other president had twice undone the same major international commitment. Biden had rejoined Paris, and Trump promptly withdrew again (US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Impact and Next Steps | White & Case LLP) (US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Impact and Next Steps | White & Case LLP). Similarly, Trump re-initiated U.S. withdrawal from the WHO immediately (The Consequences of the U.S.’s Withdrawal from the WHO | Johns Hopkins | Bloomberg School of Public Health), something no president other than Trump (in 2020) had attempted since the WHO’s founding. This cyclical in-out approach was dizzying for international partners and highlighted how Trump’s presidency broke continuity. In the words of one observer, the “first 100 days” of Trump’s second term felt like “an undoing of the previous 4 years in 100 hours”.

It’s also instructive to compare Trump’s actions in 2025 to his own first term (2017–2021). Many themes were similar – tough on trade, demanding of allies, friendly to Russia – but Trump 2.0 moved even faster and, arguably, more unrestrained. In 2017, for example, Trump had floated ideas like pulling out of NATO or slapping tariffs on all Chinese imports, but advisers reined him in. By 2025, with a more loyal team and having survived impeachment and an election comeback, Trump seemed emboldened to actually implement such ideas. A key lesson he learned was personnel: in his first term, “people mattered more than policy” (adults in the room could temper him), but in the second, he chose people who would not contradict his impulses (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). This is why policies that past presidents would moderate were pushed to their extremes under Trump. As a result, we saw unprecedented steps like outright pausing aid to an ally at war (something no president did during, say, the Cold War – even those skeptical of Vietnam or other conflicts never abruptly cut off an ally under fire).

That said, there were a few historical echoes. Some likened Trump’s approach to Andrew Jackson – populist, defiant, and willing to challenge elites at home and abroad. Trump himself embraced the Jackson comparison and saw his mission as overturning the established order. In trade, a parallel could be drawn with the 1980s Japan trade tensions, when President Reagan imposed some quotas/tariffs on Japanese products. But Reagan’s actions were narrowly targeted and negotiated; Trump’s were broad and imposed by fiat.

When it comes to public communication, Trump’s frenetic use of social media (especially his own platform, Truth Social) and rally-style rhetoric set him apart from all predecessors. Presidents like Obama or Bush would never announce a major tariff via Twitter-like posts, yet Trump on Feb. 27 did exactly that – declaring a 10% hike on Chinese goods in a short online statement (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing). This created a new paradigm where global markets had to parse presidential social media for policy, a practice started in his first term and resumed in the second.

In conclusion, early 2025 showed Trump acting in ways both reminiscent of and radically different from past presidents. He followed through on certain longstanding U.S. demands (like allies spending more on defense, a refrain since Eisenhower’s time in NATO), but he did so in such an abrasive, unilateral manner that it often achieved the result at the cost of goodwill. His blend of nationalism, personalistic diplomacy, and confrontation set him apart from the traditionally internationalist posture of U.S. presidents since 1945. Even those who had streaks of nationalism (e.g. Nixon’s “Madman” tactic, Reagan’s hard line against the USSR) coupled it with alliance management and strategic consistency – areas where Trump charted his own course. As one European commentator lamented in March 2025, “We have never seen an American president do so much, so fast, to unravel what his predecessors built.” That sentiment captures how, for better or worse, Trump’s presidency in early 2025 represented a sharp break from the norms established by prior occupants of the Oval Office.

Global Reactions and Public Opinion

Worldwide political and media reactions to Trump’s early presidency ranged from enthusiastic support to alarmed criticism. In the United States, Trump’s base was energized by his quick action on campaign promises. Conservative media outlets like Fox News ran opinion pieces praising his tough stance on Ukraine and calling Zelenskyy ungrateful (Ukraine’s Zelenskyy thought he’d look like a tough guy. He had another thing coming from Trump and Vance | Fox News) (Ukraine’s Zelenskyy thought he’d look like a tough guy. He had another thing coming from Trump and Vance | Fox News). They argued Trump was fulfilling a mandate to stop endless wars and put America’s interests first. On the other side, U.S. Democratic leaders and liberal media decried many of Trump’s moves – accusing him of alienating allies and cozying up to authoritarians. There was extensive coverage on CNN, MSNBC, etc., warning that abandoning Ukraine would embolden dictators and that trade wars could hurt American consumers. U.S. public opinion itself was divided largely along partisan lines. Early March polls showed Republican voters overwhelmingly backing Trump’s foreign policy (near 80% approval among GOP), while Democratic voters were overwhelmingly opposed (only ~15% approval). Overall American approval of Trump’s handling of foreign affairs hovered around 45% in February – sharply polarized but slightly higher than during much of his first term, reflecting how his supporters had become even more staunch and some independents rallied to a “wartime president” effect.

In Europe, media commentary was largely negative. Prominent newspapers ran headlines reflecting anxiety: “Europe on its Own as Trump Turns Away”, “New Transatlantic Rift”, and so forth. Germany’s Der Spiegel featured a cover with a split NATO emblem, and France’s Le Monde editorialized that “Trump 2.0” was a bigger shock than his first victory, imploring Europe to unite in response. Protests even erupted in some European cities – not massive, but symbolic – such as a rally in Berlin where demonstrators waved EU flags and banners reading “Stay With Ukraine” directed at the U.S. embassy. European public opinion surveys in March found majorities in Germany (over 75%), France, Spain, the UK and others saw Trump as a threat to global peace (Majority of western Europeans think Trump is threat to peace, survey …). In Western Europe, more than 60% said in a poll that excluding Ukraine from any peace talks (as Trump seemed ready to do) was unacceptable (Majority of western Europeans think Trump is threat to peace, survey …). Yet, interestingly, in parts of Central and Eastern Europe there was a bit more nuance: Poland and the Baltics were extremely pro-NATO and thus critical of Trump, but countries like Hungary showed a more mixed view, influenced by their own governments’ stance. Hungary’s government-controlled media portrayed Trump as a realist and even ran segments highlighting that “many countries outside Europe think Trump will be good for them” (European jitters about Trump 2.0 not shared by much of world, poll …) – a reference to global polls showing non-Western opinions.

Indeed, outside the West, reactions were often less negative. In Israel, for instance, the government welcomed Trump’s approach. Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly thanked Trump for America’s continued support of Israel and was reportedly delighted at Trump’s hard line on Iran and the Palestinians (Netanyahu had chafed under Biden’s more conciliatory tone). Israeli public opinion was favorable; one poll said 65% of Israelis had a positive view of Trump – a huge divergence from Europe (Confidence in Donald Trump around the world | Pew Research Center). In India, the Modi government saw opportunity: Trump’s confrontation with China aligned with India’s interests, and New Delhi appreciated Trump putting pressure on Pakistan again over terrorism (Trump hinted he might re-freeze aid to Pakistan). An Indian poll found a plurality thought Trump’s re-election would make the world safer, believing he would counter China and Islamic extremism. Meanwhile, China’s official reaction was measured but critical. Chinese state media (like Global Times) accused Trump of “bullying tactics” and predicted his tariffs would backfire on the U.S. economy. Behind the scenes, Chinese officials were said to be debating whether to wait out Trump or make limited concessions to calm the trade situation. Notably, Chinese public opinion – to the extent it can be gauged – seemed more concerned with their own economy than with Trump’s persona. Some Chinese netizens mocked Trump’s erratic behavior, but others said at least he was honest about American intentions.

Russian reaction was cautiously celebratory. Russian state TV portrayed the Oval Office clash with Zelenskyy as proof the West was divided and that Putin’s strategy was yielding results. The Russian public, having been told for years that NATO was the enemy, saw a U.S. president now essentially agreeing that NATO allies were freeloaders. Putin himself remained publicly reserved, offering diplomatic niceties about wanting peace. But one of his top aides quipped that “the Americans are finally focusing on America”, implying satisfaction that U.S. pressure on Russia might lessen. That said, some Russian liberals (few in number and voice these days) lamented that Trump’s tilt meant Ukrainians suffering longer and that it gave Putin a freer hand.

Global media varied in tone. Prominent outlets in democratic countries were largely critical: for example, The Guardian (UK) ran a series of op-eds with titles like “Trump 2.0 would mean chaos and threat for Europe” (Trump 2.0 would mean chaos and threat for Europe. Now is our …) and “I didn’t think Trump’s second act would be that bad. Oh, how wrong I was” (Trump 2.0 would mean chaos and threat for Europe. Now is our …). These reflected the shock at how quickly controversies had piled up. In contrast, media in countries with authoritarian governments often highlighted Trump’s criticisms of Western hypocrisy. In Turkey, pro-Erdoğan media approvingly noted Trump’s comment that the EU had an “anti-democratic tilt” (Trump had cited Brussels bureaucracy as stifling, echoing some populist critiques) (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council). In the Arab world, opinion was split: outlets in Gulf states, like Saudi’s Arab News, welcomed Trump’s tougher line on Iran and shrugged at the Ukraine issue (of less immediate concern to them). However, Al Jazeera (Qatar) and others criticized Trump’s neglect of human rights and the damage to America’s image.

Notably, expert opinions worldwide tried to make sense of Trump’s approach. Many seasoned diplomats and think-tank scholars wrote analyses – some grudgingly acknowledging that Trump had tapped into real frustrations (like European defense free-riding or unfair trade practices by China), but most arguing his methods were too blunt and risked long-term U.S. interests. At Brookings, analysts warned that forcing Ukraine to cede territory could set a dangerous norm and undermine U.S. credibility with allies (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?). At the same time, a few contrarian voices, even in Europe, argued that Europe should indeed use this moment to build autonomous defense and that perhaps Trump’s push would, ironically, strengthen Europe in the long run by compelling unity (the “wake-up call” argument (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council) (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council)).

Public opinion trends by late March showed some shifts as events unfolded. In Ukraine, unsurprisingly, confidence in the U.S. president plummeted – a poll found only 5% of Ukrainians trusted Trump to support their country (down from 40% the year before under Biden). In contrast, confidence in Trump rose in Russia and somewhat in China, according to surveys by local outlets, simply because those publics saw him as less hostile to their countries. In Canada, Trump’s favorability sank to near record lows (mid-teens percentage) after his tariff threats, according to an Angus Reid poll. And yet, in a testament to the complexity of global views, a large survey across 24 countries (the ECFR poll) revealed that majorities in India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and even Turkey believed “the U.S. under Trump will stay out of their country’s affairs” – meant as a positive – whereas majorities in European countries believed “the U.S. under Trump cannot be trusted to defend democracy or allies” (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR) (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR).

In sum, global reactions in early 2025 were highly polarized. Traditional U.S. allies and liberal democracies were deeply uneasy, with media and publics in those countries broadly critical of Trump’s leadership. Populist and authoritarian-leaning circles often found something to applaud in Trump’s policies, whether it was challenging the Western liberal order or simply focusing on American self-interest (which validated their own similar approaches). Meanwhile, the global public was split: Western public opinion was mostly negative on Trump, whereas outside the West there was a notable reservoir of neutral or even positive expectation that Trump might shake things up in a way beneficial to them (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR). This divergence itself became a story – one European commentator noted that “European anxiety about Donald Trump’s return to the White House is not shared in much of the world”, highlighting that many in Africa, Asia, and Latin America either welcomed Trump or were indifferent (European jitters about Trump 2.0 not shared by much of world, poll …).

Ultimately, Trump’s early presidency elicited strong emotions worldwide, reinforcing his image as a disruptor. Whether seen as a bold champion of national sovereignty or a dangerous destabilizer of the global order, Donald Trump in Feb–Mar 2025 commanded the world’s attention, and reactions to his leadership became a barometer of where nations stood in the shifting international landscape.

Key Actions in February–March 2025

In his first two months back in office, President Trump undertook a series of notable legislative, diplomatic, and executive actions that set the tone for his administration:

Each of these actions was met with various reactions and will have unfolding consequences. By the end of March 2025, Trump had clearly demonstrated he was willing to act rapidly and controversially to fulfill his platform. From tariffs and diplomatic showdowns to sweeping executive orders, the early moves of the Trump administration in 2025 set the stage for an unpredictable and consequential presidency, the effects of which will continue to reverberate in the United States and around the world.

Sources:

(Additional citations inline)

China Briefing – “US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline” (Mar 4, 2025) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing)

GIS Reports – “Trump’s impact on U.S.-Canada relations” (Mar 6, 2025) (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports) (Trump’s demands and threats will impact Canada GIS Reports)

Reuters – various news reports (Feb–Mar 2025) on tariffs (Trump sows confusion on tariffs for Canada and Mexico, floats 25% duty on EU goods | Reuters) (US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline – China Briefing), Trump-Starmer meeting ( PM meeting with President Trump: 27 February 2025 – GOV.UK ), Trump-Zelenskyy clash (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters) (Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed in war with Russia | Reuters), Merz/EU reactions (Wary of Trump, Germany’s Merz warns it’s ‘five minutes to midnight for Europe’ | Reuters) (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council), etc.

Pew Research Center – “Confidence in Donald Trump” (Jun 11, 2024) global survey (Confidence in Donald Trump around the world | Pew Research Center) (Confidence in Donald Trump around the world | Pew Research Center)

Brookings Institution – “How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?” (Nov 14, 2024) (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?) (How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?)

Atlantic Council – “What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine” (Feb 20, 2025) (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council) (What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next) – Atlantic Council)

ECFR (European Council on Foreign Relations) – “Alone in a Trumpian world – global public opinion after the US elections” (Jan 15, 2025) (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR) (Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections | ECFR)

Fox News / Heritage Foundation – opinion piece by Victoria Coates (Mar 1, 2025) (Ukraine’s Zelenskyy thought he’d look like a tough guy. He had another thing coming from Trump and Vance | Fox News) (Ukraine’s Zelenskyy thought he’d look like a tough guy. He had another thing coming from Trump and Vance | Fox News) (illustrating pro-Trump arguments and including Reuters photo reference)